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COMPARATIVE LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION
VERA BOLGIR
EVER since the celebrated Roman Committee of Ten for the
Enactment of Positive Law, the decemviri legibus scribendis, was
formed in 450 B.C., and a delegation sent abroad to study foreign
legislation, comparative law has been recognized as a useful means of
domestic reform. The Committee, so we are told, was established in
the course of the long struggle of the plebeians with the patricians in
Rome, and its main function, the reduction of the multitude of the
scattered legal customs of the early Republic to written form, was
among the most important achievements of the common Roman citi-
zenry. This first restatement of the ius civile, the common law of the
Roman people, as codified in the Twelve Tables, was based upon a
thorough study of the laws of Greece, and was the original constitu-
tion of a legal system embracing one-half of the Western World, the
civil law.
This general receptiveness to adapt foreign customs and laws to
domestic needs continued until the nineteenth century when, after
the fall of the Napoleonic empire, resurgent nationalism produced its
concomitant evils: isolationism, autarchy, and an exaggerated rever-
ence for national institutions, all of these inimical to objective com-
parison. This same trend was repeated in the United States. Here,
nationalism was fostered by the Revolution of the thirteen colonies,
and the feeling of splendid isolation, accentuated by the deceptive
bulwark of the Atlantic, eclipsed the truly humanistic influence of
Kent and Story. Yet, in the relatively short periods of warless pros-
perity after the industrial revolution, the necessity for international
intercourse and exchange of ideas became eminently apparent. This
general tendency has naturally been felt also in the domain of law;
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hence the founding of institutes for comparative legal research like
the Society of Comparative Legislation in Paris, in 1869, the British
Society of Comparative Legislation, in 1894, the Belgian Institute of
Comparative Law, in 1907, and the Comparative Law Bureau of the
American Bar Association in 1907. This trend scarcely abated be-
tween the two world wars, as the multiplication of comparative law in-
stitutes in Europe, in the United States, and the Latin-American
countries demonstrates. The years since 1945 have evinced an un-
precedented need for the creation of institutions capable of furnishing
information on certain points of foreign legislation, of placing at the
disposal of legal practitioners exact documentation, and of filling the
gaps occasioned by the destructions of the war.'
It is only natural that the increased interest in comparative law
should branch out also into the domain of legal education. And it is
here, perchance in the most sensitive territory of law, that the short-
comings of the past are most apparent. Taught law is tough law, said
Maitland, and the importance of the formation of the thinking and
of the approach to the fundamental problems of society of generations
of future lawyers is not to be underestimated and indeed is recog-
nized. Significant efforts are being made to reform legal education on
national as well as on organized international levels. In Europe, a
law for the reform of legal education has been enacted in France;
2
in Germany, an inquiry was organized by the Gesellschaft ffir
Rechtsvergleichung in 1951, to ascertain the status of comparative
law teaching in German universities during the years 1945-1951.8
In the same year, in the United States, the Committee on Comparative
Civil Procedure and Practice of the Section of International and Com-
parative Law of the American Bar Association, distributed a question-
naire among the members of the Association of American Law Schools,
to ascertain the availability and nature of the instruction offered in
comparative law.4 In 1950, UNESCO decided to conduct a general
1 Inquiry on the Organization and Purpose of Institutes of Comparative Law.
General Report, presented to the International Committee of Comparative Law during
the sessions at Munich, July 28-30, 1954, by Marc Ancel. English translation in 4 Ams.
J. Coazv. L. 248 (1955).
2 Dainow, Revision of Legal Education in France: A Four-Year Law Program,
7 J. LEGAL. ED. 495 (1955); Andr6 Tunc, New Developments in Legal Education in
France, 4 Am. J. Coux. L. 419 (1955).
3 Au nr & ZwEIGERT, RECHTSVERGLEICHuNG IM DEUTSCHEN HOCESCHULUNTERRICT
(Tiibingen, 1952), reviewed in 2 Am. J. Coimy. L. 408 (1953).
4 Re, Comparative Law Courses in the Law School Curriculum, 1 Am. J. Cor. L.
233 (1952).
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survey looking to the improvement of methods in teaching social sci-
ences, including law. In 1952, in Cambridge, England, a Symposium on
the Teaching of Law was held to evaluate the various national reports
submitted to UNESCO, and to point out the merits and inadequacies
of legal education as appearing from these reports.' In 1954, the
Fourth Conference of Comparative Law, held in Paris, organized a
panel discussion on the significance of introducing comparative law in
the legal curriculum, in the course of which the latest reports on the
problem were exhaustively treated. The present article is devoted to
a survey of the results of these various activities.
Without seeking to indulge in criticism and self-criticism to an
extreme, it would seem useful, nevertheless, to begin with the nega-
tive aspects on which the reports from both sides of the Atlantic are
entirely unanimous. These center around the theoretical uncertainty
regarding the exact nature and functions of comparative law, and the
practical difficulties which stand in the way of introducing regular
courses of comparative law in the curricula of the various law schools.
The first source of difficulty is the definition, or rather the im-
precise definition, of comparative law. This of course is not surpris-
ing in view of the variety of definitions given to law itself, which range
from the conception of law as a mere instrument of force in the hands
of the strongest social power to its abstract conception as a body of
logical norms. Consequently, comparative law has been defined either
as an autonomous branch of science,6 or the combination of two dis-
tinct doctrines, that of comparative legal history and comparative
legislation,7 while in the majority view comparative law is a method of
legal research applied to various purposes, for instance, the practical
5 A detailed analysis of the various national reports has been published by UNESCO
in the series, The University Teaching of Social Sciences. This report was prepared by
Professor Charles Eisenmann of the University of Paris for the International Committee
of Comparative Law; in addition to the survey on the organization of law teaching, it
contains an excellent analysis of the theoretical problems involved in the teaching of
comparative law. EisENA43N , THE UNIVERSITy TEACH=nG OF SOCIM SCIENCES: LAw
(Paris, 1954).
0 Cf. Caio Mario da Silva Pereira, Derecho Comparado, Ciencia Azitonoma, 6
BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO ComPARADO DE MEXIco, No. 17, p. 9 (1953).
7 Lambert, La fonction du droit compar6. Procisverbaux du Congr6s de droit
compar6 de 1900, at 167-170; Saleilles, Conception et objet de la science du droit com-
par6, 29 BULLETIT DE LA SOCIET DE LEGISLATION COAIPAR9 394 (1899-1900).
8 ScHmNTZER, VEROLEICHENDE RECHISLEHEE (Basel, 1945), at 3 ff.; GuTTERIDGE,
COMsPARATIV LAW (Cambridge, 1949) at 10; DAvID, TAIT- ELEMENTAIRM DE DROIT
Civiz CoatPAR9 (Paris, 1950) at 4 ff.
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aims of the unification of laws,9 or analytical research in legal history
and sociology."0
This indeterminacy respecting the nature and functions of com-
parative law is evident from the replies given in the German and the
United States questionnaires to the question: "What courses are of-
fered in comparative law?" In the United States, courses under this
heading included Roman Law and Domestic Relations, insofar as the
latter covered aspects of Roman Catholic marriage law and the prac-
tice before the Diocesan Chancery courts," whereas in Germany,
courses in foreign laws were listed as comparative, but Roman law was
excluded from this category. In Germany, furthermore, courses on
special topics, as for instance statute law and case law, the legal
norm in its relation to members of an association, problems in legal
transactions, were classified as comparative. What the authors of the
German report consider as the highest form of comparative law teach-
ing, viz., courses which include simultaneous comparison of the current
laws of various legal systems without special emphasis on one given
law, were offered at fairly irregular intervals and only in a few of the
German universities. These were listed as "Introduction to compara-
tive law," and were given either as two-hour credit courses or as two
seminar hours per week in each semester. On the other hand, courses
in foreign laws were more extensively conducted, with special attention
to the laws of France, Great Britain, and the United States; the legal
system of the latter being the model for democratic constitutional
development and principles. Centers of East European laws, especially
Russian law, are dependent on the residence of specialists in this
field; hence the establishment of Russian institutes in Marburg and in
Gbttingen."2
In the United States, twenty-six of the ninety-seven law schools
that received the questionnaire, replied in the affirmative with respect
9 Rotondi, The Proposed Franco-Italian Code of Obligations, 3 Am. J. ComP. L.
345 (1954). A concise survey of activities in legal unification is offered in Unification
of Law: A General Survey of Work for the Unification of Private Law (Drafts and
Conventions) 1947-1952 (Rome, 1954).
10 Yntema, Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law, in 2 LAw: A CENTURY
or PROGRESS, 346 (New York, 1937); Smith, Elements of Law, in STUDYING LA-W, ed. by
Arthur T. Vanderbilt (New York, 1955) at 210 ff.; Pound, Some Thoughts About
Comparative Law, in 1 Festschrift fiir Ernst Rabel, 7 (Tiibingen, 1953); Id. 1 Am. J.
Cosrv. L. 1 (1952); Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 Amr. J. ComP. L.
70 (1955).
11 See note 4, supra, at 237.
12 See note 3 supra.
[VOL. 1
COMPARATIVE LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION
to carrying courses in comparative law. On the whole, the situation
here shows the same characteristics as in Europe; the emphasis is
more on information respecting foreign laws than on simultaneous
comparison of the laws of several countries, while courses in Roman
law are figured as comparative. On the other hand, the courses offered
cover a wider ground than those in Europe, as a number of schools
include courses on the laws of the Latin-American countries. Also,
the analytical selection of topics indicates more thorough and expert
methods of instruction. Thus, the law schools of Harvard, Columbia,
Cornell, Chicago, Louisiana, and Tulane universities offer regular
courses and seminars on the following topics: the French legal sys-
tem, including the organization and administration of justice, the
sources of French law, and the basic principles of French law; com-
parative courses in the institutions of agency, obligations, and real
property; introduction to the civil law systems and their judicial ad-
ministration chosen from topics in the fields of torts, property, bills
and notes, and conflict of laws; basic problems in international busi-
ness transactions and litigation; various seminars in comparative-
historical method; in civil-law institutions;' and philosophy of law. 3
In addition, a number of institutes specializing in foreign laws have
been established and function regularly, such as the Latin-American
institutes of New York University, of Southern Methodist University,
and the University of Miami. To these should be added the Compara-
tive Law Institute of New York University.
The variety of topics chosen for teaching comparative law
actually does not preclude the introduction of additional regular
courses on any topic of comparative interest and use. Practical dif-
ficulties, however, impose serious limitations. All the national re-
ports submitted to the Paris Conference are unanimous in their
enumeration: an already overcharged curriculum during the entire
undergraduate and graduate period, lack of knowledge of foreign
languages, a feature especialy pointed out in the United States re-
ports, and the absence of foreign literature and reference materials,
this latter a serious handicap in Europe. Due to the primary im-
portance of the required basic courses in the undergraduate period, as
well as the required specialization on the graduate level, comparative
law courses are merely elective. This results naturally in the participa-
13 Stevenson, Comparative and Foreign Law in American Law Schools, 50 CoL. L.
REV. 613 (1950).
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tion of students who desire to avoid undue effort,' 4 a desire which is
at least halfway met by the courses anyway; as the reports from
France, Belgium, and Greece indicate, due to the limited available
time, these courses represent merely a superficial introduction to An-
glo-American law, or a legal comparison along general lines. The
heavy requirements of the regular courses even in the case of candi-
dates for an advanced degree, do not follow an entire year for com-
parative legal problems.' 5
Two reports to the Paris Conference, however, should be treated
at some length, because they demonstrate the status of legal instruc-
tion in law schools where the introduction of comparative law is be-
yond the initial stages of experimentation. The first report was sub-
mitted by Professor Edward L. Johnson of the University of Durham
in Great Britain, the second by Professor W. Friedmann of the Uni-
versity of Toronto.
Professor Johnson points out that in the legal curriculum in
England, where Roman law is a required course, the introduction of
the method of legal comparison offers no difficulties, not even in the
first year of undergraduate studies. Also, the required courses in legal
philosophy and private international law during the third year of
undergraduate studies offer wide possibilities for comparative legal
research. The course in private international law covers the case law
of various countries, for instance, that of Great Britain and France,
from the viewpoint of the differences in matrimonial regimes, com-
munity property, divorce, and nullity, whereas the course in legal
philosophy, or jurisprudence, treats the evolution of ideas that led to
the different aspects of the fundamental legal conceptions. Here
again, however, we find the recurrent observation that these courses
are necessarily only slightly beyond the superficial; nevertheless, they
are of value to the students as evidencing that the rules and particular
institutions of Great Britain are by far neither the best, nor do they
offer the only possible solutions.
In the second report, Professor Friedmann takes the same ap-
proach to comparative law teaching as his colleague in Great Britain.
In Canada, however, a country which, as the saying goes, lies at the
crossroads of the two great legal systems, legal comparison, in teach-
34 Boyer, Report submitted to the Fourth Conference of Comparative Law (Paris,
1954).
15 Cavers, Report submitted to the Fourth Conference of Comparative Law,
(Paris, 1954).
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ing as well as in practice, is facilitated by the constant interaction of
the common law and the civil law. This applies especially to
Quebec, where, as Professor Friedmann points out, lawyers are more
familiar with the common law than their British Canadian colleagues
are with the civilian system. Nevertheless, any approach to com-
parative law in the Canadian scene leads necessarily in medias res to
everyday legal problems, the treatment of which forms the basis of
comparative law teaching. Therefore, instead of giving a historical
survey of the various laws, it has proved more effective to use the com-
parative method in connection with the discussion of certain selected
topics through which insight is gained into the structure and the basis
of a foreign legal system. For instance, a comparative study of install-
ment selling during periods of monetary inflation, a problem that in-
volves the structure and the concept of contracts in both legal sys-
tems, brings forward as a matter of course the importance of the com-
parative aspects of causa and consideration, unjust enrichment, and
quasi contracts. Another problem of comparative interest is the dif-
ference in the property regimes of the two systems, the central topic
being the difference in the conceptions of the institutions of the trust
and the fiducie. Another subject for comparison is the division of
public law and private law in both legal systems, and the various re-
sulting solutions for the protection of individuals.
At the University of Toronto, comparative law is a required
course during the third year of the curriculum, which may be taken
alternately to public international law. Graduate courses on a more
extensive basis are facilitated by the invaluable advantage of having
at ready disposal experts of both legal systems; consequently an ex-
change program has been established between the University of
Toronto and the three law schools of Quebec, each program comprising
three to five conferences at which the fundamental problems of civil
law and common law are discussed. Such problems include the legal
development of Quebec in its relation to French law and to the com-
mon law; the comparative aspects of immovable property; of the
fiducie; a comparison between the marriage laws of Quebec and those
of the common-law provinces of Canada; the function of precedents,
of stare decisis; and the place and effects of public law in both sys-
tems.
In comparing the results of the two 1951 questionnaires and those
of the reports to the 1954 conference, a definite improvement may be
observed, and it is at this point that the critical and negativistic as-
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pects come to an end. As surveyed in the 1954 reports, the serious ef-
forts of the hommes de bonne volont6, who for this purpose should be
called legal comparatists, are commencing to produce beneficial re-
sults. These are manifested in Europe by a general recognition that
the introduction of comparative law courses in the universities is of ut-
most importance for the general legal culture of the students of law,
who in the Western Hemisphere are the collective successors to a com-
mon historical and cultural heritage.16 In the United States, on the
other hand, beyond this recognition, practical measures are being
taken to reform legal education on the undergraduate level, and to
introduce international and comparative aspects in the required courses
of the curriculum. The report of Professor David F. Cavers is the
most comprehensive description of this trend, and deserves notice as
an example of a well-organized effort. The report describes the com-
parative law curriculum at the Harvard Law School for the academic
year 1953-54, during which the courses in comparative law were
grouped around three main problems: problems of world order, prob-
lems of world economics, and the comparison of legal systems. The
courses in the last category included an introductory course to the
various civil law systems; a course which gave a comparison between
the law of the USSR and that of the United States; and two special-
ized seminars in constitutional law. Professor Cavers repeats the
general observation that participation in these courses is very low, for
reasons attributed to the heavy curriculum load at the undergraduate
as well as at the graduate level.
The foregoing survey has endeavored to represent the results of
a universally felt desire and need to reform the teaching of law. The
nature of a descriptive survey, however, does not permit any evalua-
tion of the causes that lie beneath the facts and which bring about the
surveyed results. In the present instance, as also was pointed out in
the discussions at the Paris conference, the cardinal issue involved is
the discouraging lack of enthusiasm shown by students in active par-
ticipation in comparative legal studies or, as a matter of fact, in any
course which transcends national and specialized "bread and butter"
interests. This phenomenon is universal and is acknowledged by every
"sober observer."'1 7 It is assumed that an inquiry into this aspect
16 Gutzviller, Rechtsvergleichung in Kontinentaler Sicht. Recuell de Travaux
Suisses, IVe Congris International de Droit Comparg (Gendve, 1954) 3 ff.
17 Schlesinger, Teaching Comparative Law: The Reaction of the Customer, 3 A7.
J. Comp,. L. 492 (1954).
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might be of some use, and as one who has enjoyed the benefits of study
in both legal systems, and has had the privilege of close association
since its inception with a major venture in comparative law in the
United States, the writer may appropriately add a few observations to
those already voiced by the more competent.
To discover the causes of the general lack of interest in compara-
tive law, of which the low student participation in comparative law
courses is merely an accompanying phenomenon, it will be necessary to
probe into deeper recesses than those hitherto explored for the purposes
of investigating legal education. This process, however painful, will
eventually disclose two determinative issues upon which the solution
of the problem hinges. The first concerns the general cultural struc-
ture of our society; the second, merely as an outcome of the general
pattern, the intellectual attitude of accepting without qualifications
and doubts superficial theories of fiat generalization. A thorough
treatment of these issues would go far beyond the purposes of this
article; nevertheless even a surface indication of the problems in-
volved suggests their pertinence to the special issues of legal educa-
tion.
Education, in any society and any age, reflects the characteristics
of both. Examined in this context, the general pattern of our current
educational system displays the main attributes distinctive of our
culture, regarded as "complex," "industrialized," "mechanized," and
of late as "atomic." Transposed into the field of teaching, these at-
tributes mean emphasis on concrete as against abstract science, in-
creasing importance attached to the branches of physical science, and
the gradual neglect of social sciences. This trend has led to the con-
secutive reduction or omission in higher education of classical studies,
world history, modern languages, and philosophy; witness the absolute
versatility of high school graduates in the intricate problems of driv-
ing and repair of motor vehicles, doubtless very useful, and their dis-
maying ignorance of languages, geography, and history, even those of
their own country. In legal education, the manifest results have been
the elimination of Roman law, legal history, and legal philosophy, and
universal acceptance of the prevalent view that the function of law
schools is the training of "social engineers" and "mechanics of law."'"
In the educational scheme at least, the contrast between Europe
18 Couture, Report to Universidad Mayor de la Republica, Facultad de Derecho y
Ciencias Sociales (Montevideo, 1955) at 11, 12.
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and the United States is sharply focused. In Europe, Roman law has
formed the basis of a common legal culture, uniting legal thinking
beyond and above geographical boundaries and national codifications,
fundamentally unshAken by the totalitarian warfare of arms and ideas.
This holds true also of the Latin-American countries, where, until the
codes of the middle of the nineteenth century, recourse to Roman law
was indispensable, as a guide to the mass of diffusely organized com-
pilations supplemented by countless special laws inherited from colon-
ial times.19
Moreover, Roman law, as a required topic in the first years of
the legal curriculum, involves for the civil-law student a constant his-
torical and analytical comparative training, as the legal bases of his
own national institutions are treated as developments from the old
Roman principles. Further grounds for comparison are offered by the
equally required courses in legal history and legal philosophy, neither
of which can be adequately presented in an exclusively national con-
text. Indeed, legal philosophy has been considered of such paramount
importance in the formation of thinking that this was the chair first
to be occupied by the intellectual exponents of totalitarian regimes.
This is also the explanation of the fact that publication of the tradi-
tional periodicals in legal history and legal philosophy was resumed at
the first opportunity after the termination of the second World War;
in the United States, unfortunately, there are no periodicals specifically
dedicated to these fields, due to lack of interest and consequently of
funds, while the only American periodical in comparative law finds
space on the "overcrowded" library shelves of the legal departments of
very few firms dealing in international business.2" It must be noted,
however, that this attitude has been undergoing considerable change
in the last few years as a fortuitous and paradoxical consequence of
the atomic age, which, in a contracted world, has imposed on the
United States all the burdens and responsibilities of a leading power.2'
19 Yntema, Introduction to Andris Bello: Derecho Romano. To appear in the new
official edition of Bumo, OBsAs COmPLETAS, published by the Venezuelan Government
under the editorship of Professor Rafael Caldera.
20 The current discussions on the Carmen Jones case, in which the heirs of Bizet
by invoking the moral right of the author, oppose the projection of this motion picture
in France, serves as an interesting example of the usefulness for legal counsel of in-
formation concerning the legislation and jurisprudence of France and other countries
in which arrangements are to be made to have an American film displayed. Cf. Roger-
Ferdinand, L'Affaire "Carmen Jones", 8 Ravua INTERNATiONALE Du DROrr D'AUTEUR 3
(1955) (with English and Spanish translations).
21 Conant, An Old Tradition in a New World. Address given at the Convocation
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Consequently, an increased necessity is felt to master the substantive
and procedural aspects of foreign laws, as the diminished space be-
tween the nations also contracts the distance separating their courts.
It is to be hoped that in the future this necessity will be generally
recognized, in which event the market value of the "high-class mer-
chandise" of comparative law will correspondingly increase.
22
The second issue involved, as already indicated, is the easy ac-
ceptance of generalizations together with their concomitant fallacies.
Mechanization and industrialization are not auspicious for the de-
velopment of inquisitive minds, and it is simpler to accept a statement
than to inquire into its truth, especially if it conforms to the general
trend of ideas. This phenomenon is naturally not restricted to the
field of law, but will be discussed here merely in its ramifications and
bearings on legal education.
In the course of working in comparative law, be it for purposes of
legal unification, or more modest efforts to make a foreign legal in-
stitution understood and recognized, the position most frequently en-
countered in writings as well as in personal discussions is the ab ovo
rejection of the use of legal comparison on account of the basic dif-
ferences in the two systems that make any attempt to understand or to
work with foreign law impracticable and futile. It is a matter of
questionable satisfaction that this prejudice is fairly common in both
systems, although never shared by comparatists. Hence, the special
arguments adduced in support of this prejudice deserve to be treated
in some detail. They run as follows:
The unbridgeable chasm between civil law and common law
originates in their fundamentally different evolution. Civil law de-
veloped from Roman law, hence its strict adherence to abstract theory
and logical principles. Common law, on the other hand, untainted by
Roman principles and influence, evolved along the flexible lines of
judicial precedents through the practical media of decided cases. In
the course of its development, civil law eventually rigidified in codes,
which, due to the inherent rigor of their construction, put an end to
legal reform, whereas the common law, unchecked by codes and
guided only by judge-made principles, produced no obstacles to rapid
improvement. This flexibility of the common law is enhanced by its
commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Founding of Michigan State
College, East Lansing, Michigan, February 12, 1955.
22 Schlesinger, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 492.
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unique duplication of law and equity, a feature incomprehensible to
civilians, who adhere to a similarly incomprehensible division of civil
and commercial law, while on the other hand, a common lawyer will
never grasp the intricacies of deductive reasoning necessitated by
civil law codes and by the exclusive emphasis of civilians on theoreti-
cal principles and their total disregard of actual practice.
To a lawyer who hails from a civil-law country, for instance from
Hungary, these arguments seem incomprehensible and even prepos-
terous. Hungary belongs to the civilian system, and although its legal
development was strongly influenced by Roman law, the latter was
never officially received. Until 1946, Hungary, like England, had no
written constitution. Its private law has never been codified, and is
based on the common law of the country, collected in 1514, and a
compilation of judicial precedents, published in 1800. It might be
mentioned in passing that the property regulations of 1514 exhibited
greater similarity to those of England in 1914, than to the contem-
porary Hungarian provisions.
This, however, is merely an isolated example of the legal struc-
ture of a single country, and is mentioned only to demonstrate that
"civil law" cannot be treated as a homogeneous entity; the laws of
each country belonging to its orbit have followed their own independ-
ent history. What is, however, the essential feature of the above ar-
guments, is the cavalier disregard of the basic function of law, be it
civil or common, namely, the regulation of human behavior, composed
of human aims and volitions, which are strangely alike in their ends, as
well as in their disregard for the legal system under which they come
to pass. The primary factors which condition human behaviok are of
a social, economic, and political order,23 for which law provides merely
the necessary techniques of realization. 4 In this context, it is en-
tirely immaterial whether the doctrines of causa or consideration were
developed through inductive or deductive reasoning, or the institu-
tion of the trust through the circumvention of a Statute of Uses, or
in the total absence of statutory provisions through judicial precedents
as in France, Germany, and Switzerland. The guiding human motives
in these doctrines are nothing but temperate caution regarding gra-
tuitous promises or transactions in which there is no quid pro quo,
23 FRiEDumANN, LEGAL THEORY 386 (3d ed., London, 1953).
24 Pringsheim, The Inner Relationship between English and Roman Law, 5 CAmn.
L. J. 347, 359 (1933-35).
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in the one case, and in the other, the desire to provide benefits for a
third party. It is also immaterial whether the legal technique with
which these ends were accomplished developed in the course of time
into codified provisions or binding precedents-the final aim to be
achieved has always been the same: justice according to law.
It might be argued, naturally, that excursions into the philo-
sophical depths of law are irrelevant to past history and present pro-
cedure, and moreover are beyond the needed equipment of teachers
employed to train future mechanics of law. Therefore, attention will
be concentrated below on the merely factual historical relevance of
these arguments, two of which deserve special notice: that the com-
mon law has developed without Roman or civilian influence; that the
mechanics of legal reform in the two systems- allegedly has been
trammelled by rigid codes in the one, facilitated by flexible judicial
precedents in the other.
While there might be some exaggeration in Shaw's suggestion that
life in England has incurred great losses in not being conquered by
Napoleon as well as by Julius Caesar,25 such losses are certainly not
traceable in the laws of that country. History proves that there never
were and never are any barriers to ideas; from the earliest times, the
natural law of Rome, the God-granted rights of Christianity, and the
rational reason of enlightenment traversed with equal ease the Chan-
nel as well as the Atlantic, from where they rebounded with un-
paralleled force to influence the democratic formation of the Western
World by such constitutional edifices as the Declaration of Independ-
ence and the Bill of Rights.
It is also an interesting feature of history, that even the evolution
of the civil law and the common law followed analogous channels. In
each, when the power of the state was sufficiently developed, the ad-
ministration of justice was soon professionalized; in each the system
of private law became articulated in specific forms of action, and the
rigidly formalized scheme of rights had to be supplemented, cor-
rected, and superseded by a parallel system of equitable remedies. 26
Both were essentially systems of case law, evolved by specialists
generally indifferent to history and with little theory and less phil-
osophy,27 and each has produced an incomparable elementary treatise
25 SHAw, Preface to The Man of Destiny. PLAYS PLEASANT (London, 1949).
26 Yntema, Roman Law and Its Influence on Western Civilization, 35 CORNELL
L. Q. 77, 78 (1949).
27 Id. at 78.
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of eminent influence, two works of inspired journalism, simple, clean,
and persuasive, the Institutes of Gaius and the Commentaries of
Blackstone.28 In both systems, extra-legal magistrates exercised im-
portant law-creating functions, but while the Roman praetor's aequitas
became absorbed in the course of time in the statutory enactments of
civil law, the British chancellor's equity continued its existence as
a supplementary body of flexible rules, applied by discretionary ju-
dicial power, which, however, as time went on became, in many in-
stances, more rigid than the rules which it intended to modify.2
Also, this analogy in development, due to the basic resemblance
of two nations, both capable of and destined to create an empire, ac-
counts for their parallel legal institutions. Suffice it to point to the
similarity between the Roman praedial servitudes and the common law
easements, the fiducia and the trust, the heres and the executor, and
the various regulations on subrogation. 30 The Roman origins of the
law merchant, the maritime and admiralty laws are too well-known to
be treated at length. In addition, the influence of civil law on judicial
thinking is also apparent. Lord Mansfield, for instance, was much
criticized for his perpetual resort to Roman law and to the opinion of
civilians in cases involving partnerships, commercial organizations,
and sales, 3 -- but he was a Scotchman. From the beginning of the
nineteenth century, however, civilian authorities were frequently cited,
and although the voice of Justinian would not be heard in British
courts more than 'once as against a thousand cases, and arguments of
counsel based exclusively on the Digest might have occasioned de-
pression, if not a certain irritation on the Bench,3" civil law was often
resorted to in "investigating the principles on which the law is
grounded. 33
28 BUCKLAND & McNAiR, RoMAN LAw AND COMMON LAW, 22 (2d Rev. Ed. by
F. H. Lawson, Cambridge, 1952).
29 ALLEN, LAW AND DisORDERS, 154 (London, 1954); DENNINO, THE NEED FOR A
NEW EQUITY, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, 1953, 1 ff. (London, 1952).
30 BUcxLAND, EQUITY IN RoMAN LAW (London, 1911).
31 Colvin, The Path of the Civil Law in the United States, GENERAL REPORT,
MEMOIRES DE L'ACADmIE INTERNATIONALE DR DROIT COMPAR9, 115 (Paris, 1934);
ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 204.
32 ALLEN, LAW IN T MAKING, 255 (5th ed. Oxford, 1951).
33 Blackburn, J., in Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (1863). This judgment
began a series of modern cases that restricted the severe principle of British contract
law known as the rule of Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn Rep. 26 (1647).
The leading British decision on the foreseeability of damages, Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch. 341 (1854) relied on the French Civil Code, and was followed in the United
States in the New York case of Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489 (1871). Cf. SEDGWICK,
MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 204 (8th Ed., New York, 1891).
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This was also the case in the United States. Here, the wall built
by the Dutch governor of Manhattan for the purpose of keeping the
British settlers without, crumbled as early as 1653,"4 and in giving way
to Wall Street, gave way at the same time to the British rights "to
such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous,"
and "to make such others as they should think necessary, not infring-
ing the general rights of Englishmen.1 35 Thus, the "pure derivative
of the pure common law," was formed into shape in the colonies by
the laws and customs of French, Dutch, and British colonists, and by
concepts transplanted from Roman equity, Dutch internationalism,
British empiricism, and French reason, until it became in its final
form-if ever law may be called final-the law of the United States.
This process is also reflected in a long series of cases, 6 in which
the judgments relied successively on the custom of Paris, on Roman-
Dutch law, and the French Civil Code,37 a practice which extends into
our days as a late judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court also
demonstrates.3
Finally, there is the other argument to consider, that the methods
of legal reform are determined in civil-law countries by the autocratic
impositions of the codes, while in common-law countries reform is
facilitated by the supple nature of judicial precedents. It might also
be apposite in this context to deal with the alleged absence of equity
in civil law. The abundance of the available material necessitates the
selection of a few outstanding examples, which may serve to demon-
strate that the broad power of the judges in civil-law countries to
adapt existing code provisions to ends which were unknown to the
drafters of the codes, is quite analogous to the functions of the judges
in common law to bring new cases within the scope of established
precedents.
34 Colvin, op. cit. supra, note 31 at 134.
35 Franklin, State of the Constitution of the Colonies (1769) in 4 FR~rArNu,
WoRxs, 300-301 (Bigelow Ed., 1887). Cf. Radin, The Rivalry of Common-Law and
Civil-Law Ideas in the American Colonies, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 404, 419
(New York, 1937).
36 Pound, The Influence of French Law in America, 3 ILL. L. RFv. 8 (1920); Col-
vin, op. cit. supra, note 31 at 162.
37 Among the cases which illustrate this trend are: Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18
(1860), Kaskaskia v. McClure,'167 Ill. 23, 47 N. E. 72 (1897), Coburn v. Harvey, 18
Wis. 156 (1864), Snedeker v. Waring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854), Dunham v. Williams, 37
N. Y. 251 (1867), Van Giesen v. Bridgeford, 18 Hun. 73, 83 N. Y. 348 (1881), Brumsby
v. N. Y. & N. C. Ry. Co., 133 N. Y. 79 (1882).
38 Vanderbilt, C. J. in Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N. J. 426, 97 A. 2d 390 (1953).
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Thus, in the field of property, the common law trust was intro-
duced by judicial precedents in France and in Switzerland, while in
Germany, this same process led to the enactment of trust statutes,
doubtless facilitated by Anglo-American occupation, in the course of
which it became evident that the trust concept is the most effective
way to manage the properties of absentee owners.3" In the field of
contracts, the introduction of the equitable remedy of specific per-
formance, 40 as well as the elaboration of the theory of the remoteness
of damage4' was incumbent on the courts, as the scant provisions of the
codes offered no guidance for the large number of newly emerging
problems. Similarly, the insufficiency of code provisions applicable
to the complex branch of torts, gave rise to a veritable edifice of judge-
made law, conspicuously exemplified by recent developments in
France and in Germany in such specialized branches as unfair trade42
and civil liability4 3 As a reason for vindicating the importance of
legal comparison, it should be mentioned, that in the last instance the
doctrinal discussions relating to responsibility without fault demon-
strate the similarity of ideas in both legal systems in developing the
notions of Act of God, unreasonable risk, and absolute nuisance.44
The above discussion has not ventured to emphasize that the in-
dividual institutions of the civil law and the common law are identical.
The two legal systems have developed under various climates of
history and have been conditioned by different social and economic
forces; these, in turn, have produced different modes of thought and
different techniques for the realization of various social ends. What
the above discussion, however, may serve to prove is the futility of
exaggerated insistence on such differences, temporal and transient, if
contrasted with the invariable and essential function of law. And it
is in this context that comparisons may be made. This function, as has
been stated above, is to provide a suitable framework within which
human activity may most effectively operate. Whether this framework
39 Bolgir, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law? 2 Am. J. ComP. L. 204 (1953).
40 Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am. J. Comp. L.
208 (1955).
41 Kahn-Freund, Remoteness of Damage in German Law, 50 L. Q. REv. 512 (1934).
42 Derenberg, The Influence of the French Code Civil on the Modern Law of Un-
fair Competition, 4 Am. J. CoMT. L. 1 (1955).
43 LAwsoN, NEGiaENcE In- T-E Civim LAW, 44 (Oxford, 1950); Esmein, Liability
in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Am. J. CoM. L.
156 (1953).
44 PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON T=E LAW 01 TORTS, 135 (Ann Arbor, 1953).
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is stated in codes or in precedents, its amendment and expansion is
achieved by the combined efforts of legislatures and courts,45 drawing
on principles of justice and equity and, if necessary, on foreign ex-
amples in which these principles have successfully been applied. Con-
sequently, legal education should not dwell on differences in technique
and thought. Beyond the practical training, whether inculcated by the
case method, which helps future members of the Bench and Bar to
cite in due form a volume of antiquated precedents,46 and to write
volumes of opinions conscious of the shadows of eternity cast by stare
decisis or at least by future casebooks, or by the magistral method of
lecturing ex cathedra that neglects practice altogether, law schools
should endeavor to adapt their teaching to the felt necessities of their
time, which include the interests of a larger community than the one
resident within their national borders.
45 For a concise comparative summary of legislative and judicial interaction, see
Pound, The Judicial Process in Action, 1 N. Y. L. F. 11 (1955); for a comparison of
the working of judicial' review in Switzerland and the United States, see Schindler,
R cHTERLICHES PR"FUXGSRECHET UND POLITISCHER MEHRHEITSwiLLE-ERAHRUNGEN DER
VERE=GTEN STAATEN-FOLGERUNGEN F'iR DIE ScHwEiz, 74 ZEATscBi u fR SCHWEIZER-
iscHEs RECHT 290, N. F. Heft 4/5 (1955). On the increasing significance of legislatibn
in the improvement of the legal system, cf. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Con-
tinental Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 40 (1934); F=IDmANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE Ml4 CON-
TEMPoRARY BnxvAiN, 237 (London, 1951).
46 For instance, in Bottomley v. Bannister, [1923] 1 K. B. 458, precedents de-
cided in 1409 and 1425 were cited to assist the judge in determining who was liable for
the leakage of a gas burner in 1929; in Bremer Oeltransport G. M. B. H. v. Drewry,
[1933] 1 K. B. 753, the learned Judge discussed cases decided in 1670, 1704, 1805, 1818,
1855, and 1866 (A. L. Goodhard, op. cit. supra, note 45, at 49, 51); while Cardozo
applied the horse-and-buggy messenger days doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale to the
erroneous transmission of a transatlantic cable message in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America, 245 N. Y. 284, 157 N. E. 140 (1927).
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